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An Analysis of Firm Support for Active Labor Market Policies 
Abstract 
Active labor market policies, defi ned as programs for marginalized workers that improve their 
chances of  fi nding stable jobs, have grown in importance since roughly 1980 due to high levels of  
unemployment. This paper examines the role of  private fi rms in active labor market policies in three 
generous welfare states—Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Whereas the participation of  pri-
vate fi rms in the implementation of  active labor market policies enhances the effi ciency of  these poli-
cies, fi rms’ increased bargaining power within the national policy-making arena raises questions about 
their continued willingness to adjust their preferences in order to accommodate public concerns. The 
results suggest that the state plays a fundamental role in building fi rm support for active labor market 
policies, although employer organizations do infl uence fi rms’ participation in these programs.
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Introduction1. 
This paper examines how well reform packages aimed at addressing the risk of  labor market 
marginalization manage to gain the support of  business. Intense coordination between private fi rms 
and other economic and political actors characterizes the industrial period during which time the bulk 
of  existing welfare state legislation was generated. The degree to which one observes a continuation 
of  such coordination speaks to the question of  whether different actors are able to develop policy 
responses to new social risks and, by extension, the viability of  a redistributive welfare state in a post-
industrial economy. 
The method used to analyze this question involves semi-structured fi rm interviews in Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, respectively. These three cases were chosen based on variation on 
the key independent variables of  interest, which include the structure of  employer organizations and 
the role of  the state. Whereas the organizational capacity of  business groups has been recognized to 
infl uence the passage of  social policy, the relative weight of  fi rm-level versus peak-level organization 
is illuminated in this study to explain the success of  active labor market policies.  Moreover, the role 
of  the state is also identifi ed as a playing a key role in the promotion of  policies to help reintegrate 
marginalized workers.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on business and the welfare state 
in order to establish broad hypothetical expectations about fi rms’ involvement in the labor market 
reintegration of  marginalized workers. Then, to begin the analysis, I fi rst review the case selection 
procedure as well as the methodology before examining the degree to which reform packages in each 
of  the three countries succeeded at garnering private fi rm involvement in the reintegration of  mar-
ginalized workers. The fi nal section concludes.
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Theoretical Framework: Business 2. 
Involvement in the Reintegration of 
Marginalized Workers 
In recent years, increased attention has been given to business interests due to the shift in em-
ployers’ bargaining power within the national policy-making arena as a result of  capital market liber-
alization and the rise of  the neo-liberal agenda. The capacity of  fi rms to relocate or reinvest outside 
national borders on the one hand and the growing view that private solutions outperform public ones 
on the other raise concerns about the continued participation of  business groups within national 
policy-making circles. In light of  these changes, governments may appear beholden to these ever 
more powerful groups in order to achieve their own public policy goals, and questions arise about the 
capacity of  governments, if  any, to woo business groups: Will employers continue to demonstrate an 
interest in responding to the concerns of  workers and public authorities? Or will employers use their 
capacity to relocate or reinvest as a carte blanche to pursue their narrow interests without anticipating 
the need to consider the interests of  other economic actors? Will the relative dominance of  private 
over public policy solutions lead to a reduction in the role of  the state in the policy-making process 
or, in a different way, generate greater potential for public-private partnerships? 
Studies of  business interests in social policy and labor market regulation have increased in re-
cent years. Scholarly attention to business interests resulted in large part from the natural process of  
theory development, where the elaboration of  differences between conceptual frameworks precedes 
the clarifi cation of  similarities (Sartori 1970). Writing in 1993, Colin Crouch describes how, over 
time, scholarship shifted from juxtaposing the analytical foundation of  their particular theoretical 
approach to synthesizing their approach with others: “The ‘social democratic’ and neo-corporatist 
schools have, with some surprise, recognized their similarity, amalgamated with ‘revisionist pluralism’, 
and taken advantage of  the theoretical elegance and rigour to be achieved by casting their arguments 
in terms of  rational action and exchange theory” (Crouch 1993, p. 11). As a result of  this process, 
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the analysis of  business interests began to infl uence understandings of  welfare state development 
and change.
A central consequence of  considering business interests with regards to the welfare state was to 
recognize the potentiality of  employer support for social policy (Baldwin 1990; Hall & Soskice 2001; 
Iversen 2005; Mares 2003). Scholars making this link generally share the view that risks associated 
with the production process motivate employers’ interests in social policy. Those working within the 
varieties of  capitalism framework base their understanding of  fi rms’ preferences over social policy 
on the dominance of  specifi c versus general skill production within the national economy. In this 
view, investment in specifi c skills involves contracting problems because workers and employers face 
potentially high costs upon interruption of  the employment relationship: workers face diffi culties 
fi nding new jobs that suit their skills; and employers cannot easily apply their existing assets to new 
business pursuits. As such, workers with specifi c skills prefer generous income support, which, in the 
case of  unemployment, will allow them suffi cient time to fi nd employment suitable to their skills. For 
their part, employers would like some guarantee that they will not lose trained workers to competing 
fi rms. As a result, in economic contexts where production relies heavily on specifi c skills, known as 
coordinated market economies, employers will support generous unemployment insurance to induce 
workers’ investment in industry-specifi c skills: high employment protection to induce their invest-
ment in fi rm-specifi c skills; established training standards to ensure the quality of  industry-specifi c 
skills; and strict social norms buttressing high levels of  fi rm-based training that ensure a high quantity 
of  high trained personnel (Hall & Soskice 2001, p. 20-27). Employers in liberal market economies, 
in contrast, will not demonstrate similar levels of  support for these social policies and labor market 
regulations, because the relative dependence on general skills in these economies does not require 
them. The major consequence of  this line of  reasoning was to identify two possible institutional con-
fi gurations for effi cient capitalist economic organization, and, by extension, highlight the potential 
for achieving economic effi ciency and social equality simultaneously in the form of  the ‘coordinated 
market economy.’
Other work in this fi eld focuses on production risks originating from a broader range of  factors. 
Baldwin (1990) examines how labor market risks of  middle class workers, such as shop-keepers and 
the self-employed, played a fundamental role in shaping the passage of  solidaristic social policy in 
Denmark, Sweden, Britain, Germany, and France. Focusing on France and Germany, Mares (2003) 
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draws on these foundations to develop a model of  employer preferences over the expansion of  un-
employment, sickness, and early retirement benefi ts, in which employers’ preferences are defi ned by 
fi rm size, skill specifi city, and the degree of  risk exposure. 
The literature cited above predominantly assesses employers’ preferences over social policy on 
the foundation of  fi rm-based characteristics; other perspectives, however, see employers’ preferences 
as derivative of  organizational factors. Business organizations provide the means for coordinating 
fi rms’ actions and thereby generating cooperative solutions over social issues. For example, busi-
ness organizations can provide the sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure 
compliance where collective action problems exist; these organizations also facilitate the payment of  
compensation to employers who do worse off  as a result of  coordinated outcomes but nevertheless 
lend their support to collective goals. Business organizations may also act as a source of  new ideas 
or disseminate information about other fi rms and government policies (Culpepper 2003). Finally, 
members of  business organizations may also develop norms of  trust and reciprocity that facilitate 
the formation of  coordinated outcomes (Crouch 1993; Katzenstein 1985; Traxler 2000). 
Whereas these studies broadened the theoretical and empirical knowledge of  business support 
for social policy, they focused almost predominantly on the period of  welfare state expansion during 
which fi nancial markets were closed and growth rates were high. In this context, business faced fewer 
opportunities to invest abroad and supported passive social policies due to their intrinsic role in fi rms’ 
production strategies. As outlined above, however, fi rms’ competitive environment has changed, and 
it remains an empirical question how their increased bargaining power has infl uenced their depend-
ence on passive social policies in the procurement of  skilled workers. 
Also, governments, for their part, are more focused on reducing reliance on passive social poli-
cies and shifting the focus towards active labor market policies, which are policies that have the goal 
of  improving labor market integration of  marginalized workers by providing income support that is 
contingent upon and indeed directly promotes participation in the labor market. Such policies include 
direct job creation in the public sector, training programs, and various wage subsidies directed at 
private fi rms. Sustained high levels of  passive policies have been shown to undermine both workers’ 
capacity to fi nd jobs after long periods of  unemployment and states’ capacity to fi nance the welfare 
state. With regards to business’ reaction to this new political agenda, it remains an empirical question 
whether fi rms will frustrate reforms of  passive policies because they continue to rely on them, fi rms 
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no longer rely on passive policies because of  their greater bargaining power, or fi rms actually have 
developed an aversion to these policies due to higher contribution rates or diffi culties fi nding skilled 
workers. In sum, changed economic conditions threaten to unravel the underpinnings of  a consensus 
that existed for a large part of  the twentieth century and it remains an empirical question whether 
fi rms will contribute their efforts to the establishment of  a new active labor market policy agenda.
The importance of  acquiring fi rms’ support for the establishment of  a new social policy lies 
in part in the diffi culties of  implementing active labor market policies. As much of  the evaluation 
literature warns, there is no guarantee that participants in active labor market programs will acquire 
stable employment. Rather, evidence shows that these programs may exhibit a range of  problems. 
When participation in an activation policy re-qualifi es participants for social benefi ts the ‘carousel’ 
effect may arise where individuals rotate between activation policy and passive support. Three other 
problems may exist that are more related to the interaction between active labor market policies and 
market effi ciency: deadweight losses arise when fi rms would have hired the person in question re-
gardless of  the subsidy; substitution effects arise when the employment chances of  the target group’s 
hiring prospects improve at the expense of  the non-target group; and displacement occurs when em-
ployment increases in subsidized fi rms are countered by employment losses in non-subsidized fi rms. 
On a general level, these problems suggest the contingency of  active labor market policies success at 
improving the probability that marginalized workers will fi nd stable employment: active labor market 
policies may just be a transfer to private fi rms, who hire the same people regardless of  the subsidy, 
and they might benefi t some workers or employers to the detriment of  others. 
Although I do not pretend to address at length the factors accounting for these problems, the 
evaluation literature does test the severity of  these various problems in assessing the impact of  ac-
tive labor market policies, and I make use of  their results. Of  particular interest for my purposes 
here is the insight of  this literature that subsidies for employment in the private sector entail lower 
economic costs and lead to better employment outcomes for program participants than direct job 
creation (Boone & van Ours 2004; Martin 2000). The greater effectiveness of  active labor market 
policies aimed at private fi rms, and, indeed, the frequently damaging effect of  public sector job crea-
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tion programs on participants’ future employment stability motivates the particular focus on the role 
of  private fi rms in active labor market policies. 
Despite the salience of  fi rm involvement for active labor market policy success, relatively little is 
known about the factors supporting the passage of  these policies. The work by C. J. Martin and D. 
Swank makes considerable headway in this respect into understanding the various factors that explain 
fi rms’ investment in active labor market policies (Martin 2004a; Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2001; 
Martin & Swank 2004). Their macro analysis demonstrates the strong effect of  business organization 
on total spending effort on active labor market policies across eighteen advanced industrialized coun-
tries with potentially complementary effects between social democratic incumbency and business or-
ganization. Signifi cant results for different dimensions of  business organizational strength, including 
coordination, centralization, and infl uence in policy-making, provide evidence for the stability of  this 
fi nding (Martin & Swank 2001; Martin & Swank 2004). 
The fi nding that business organizational strength corresponds to high spending on active labor 
market policies suggests, more generally, continuity between theoretical determinants of  social policy 
in the industrial period and the more recent period of  ‘permanent austerity.’ The organizational ca-
pacity of  employers therefore appears suffi cient to overcome internal divisions to create policies that 
benefi t the national economy more generally.
Yet the expectation that contexts with strong business organization can adjust well to changed 
conditions may not be warranted. High rates and duration of  unemployment in Belgium and Germa-
ny in the 1990s and early 2000s raise alarms about the apparently weak capacity of  these coordinated 
market economies to activate jobless individuals, particularly given the relatively low employment 
rates in these countries. The experiences of  France and Italy, though not clear-cut cases of  coordi-
nated market economies, demonstrated similar trends, raising questions about the capacity of  coun-
tries to combine social and economic goals more generally. Therefore, although the organizational 
strength of  business may indeed lead to higher spending on active labor market policies, the various 
implementation problems these policies exhibit as well as the inability of  countries that indeed spend 
highly on these policies to reduce unemployment suggests, on the one hand, that a one-dimensional 
measure of  business organizational capacity masks nuances in the capacity of  business groups to 
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contribute to the development of  effective active labor market policies and the possibility that the 
infl uence of  business organization is contingent on broader contextual factors, on the other. 
In this vein, literature accounting for the failure of  ‘consensual institutions’ (Lijphart 1999) to de-
liver optimal social outcomes have accumulated in recent years. A key challenge of  all these works has 
been to examine more closely the causal mechanisms linking the existence of  formal institutions to 
social and economic outcomes. These studies generally either point to the underlying variation among 
formal institutions frequently masked in existing measures of  coordination or point out that the ef-
fects of  formal institutions are contingent on broader contextual factors. Martin and Swank (2008) 
examine the historical determinants of  employer associations and illuminate the role of  proportional, 
multiparty systems in promoting, and federalism in impeding, the development of  social corporatist 
associations. Whereas these fi ndings provide an explanation for the broader differences that exist be-
tween coordinated and liberal welfare states, the inhibiting effect of  federalism on the formation of  
social corporatist associations provides a potentially useful tool for exploring challenges for business 
associations in the federal states of  Germany, Belgium, and Italy. As case in point, Hemerijck points 
out the strong sectoral, ideological, and linguistic divisions in the Belgian social interest group struc-
tures (Hemerijck 2006). Developing theoretical categories for the variety of  business organizational 
structures, Martin Höpner differentiates between ‘organized’ and ‘disorganized’ coordinated capital-
ism (2007) and Hicks and Kenworthy distinguish between social corporatist processes and fi rm-level 
cooperation (1998). Of  particular interest, Hicks and Kenworthy point out the potentially negative 
effects of  fi rm-level cooperation as a vehicle for realizing redistributive goals:
“Firm-level cooperation is irrelevant for decommodifi cation, ALMP, and unemploy-
ment but has regressive effects on transfer spending effort. The latter effect is somewhat 
surprising. Firm-level cooperation has often been associated with strongly neocorporatist 
countries like Sweden and Norway and strongly Christian democratic countries such as 
Germany and Belgium—sets of nations also commonly regarded as oriented toward dis-
tributive/redistributive efforts. (This is true even though cooperative fi rms and industries 
are most commonly associated with Japan.) However, our fi ndings indicate that, properly 
adjusted for association with neocorporatism and government partisanship, nations with 
more fi rm-level cooperation tend to be oriented against the use of state transfer payments 
to ameliorate material insecurities (1653).”
Therefore, forms of  fi rm-level cooperation, such as coordination between purchasers and sup-
pliers, different fi rms, and labor and management, do not necessary improve support for and may 
indeed thwart efforts to create redistributive policy. The authors explain that fi rm-level cooperation 
plays a central role in company strategy aimed at maximizing effi ciency and that, while potentially 
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improving economic growth, these prerogatives do not necessarily lead to strong support for redis-
tributive policies. The argument that social policy improves production in specifi c-skill economies 
would challenge that explanation, but this inconsistency could be resolved by assuming that business 
organization plays a more central part in policy creation rather than preference formation; institu-
tions of  fi rm-level cooperation simply do not have the capacity to bargain over changes in social 
policy legislation. 
While this discussion generally describes strong fi rm-level cooperation as rather innocuous in 
relation to the expansion of  active labor market policy, broadly understood, strong fi rm-level co-
operation may in fact be related to antipathy towards active labor market policies requiring the par-
ticipation of  private fi rms. First, by frequently specifying a target group of  potential workers, these 
policies directly intrude on the core company strategies of  human resource management. The fear 
that voluntary involvement in such policies might lead to quotas potentially causes fi rms to oppose 
the creation of  such policies at all. In other words, legislating policy, albeit voluntary in nature, that 
touches on issues related to company strategy implies the potentiality of  losing control over these ar-
eas in the future; fi rms may prefer to avoid this risk altogether. Second, where fi rm-level cooperation 
is high, fi rms have likely developed relatively more effi cient company strategies. Therefore, in these 
contexts, fi rms should be relatively more sensitive to attempts by the state to infl uence policies related 
to core company strategies. As case in point, whereas Hicks and Kenworthy’s study fi nds that fi rm-
level cooperation does not relate to active labor market policies, their measure of  active labor market 
policies includes all types of  policies and not solely those aimed at private fi rms. Therefore, although 
fi rm-level cooperation may not impede the passage of  active labor market policies per se, it may still 
weaken support for active labor market policies requiring the participation of  private fi rms. 
An additional contextual factor that has been shown to sustain the relationship between formal 
coordination on the one hand and coordinated adjustment on the other is the state. The role of  the 
state has been identifi ed as playing a key role in reinforcing employers’ coordinative capacity on the 
one hand and their support for solidaristic policies on the other (Martin & Thelen 2007). The role of  
the state on sustained coordination embodies three logics: as an employer, the state holds an intrinsic 
interest in promoting the employment prospects of  their workers; the state can also play a role in fos-
tering cooperation among the social partners; fi nally, the state can negotiate with private sector actors 
(33-34). In terms of  active labor market policies, the state plays a potentially large role in coordinat-
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ing activities with fi rms and other institutions regarding the training and integration of  marginalized 
workers. In tandem with its interest in promoting the skills of  its own public sector workers (Spicker 
1997), the state therefore holds considerable potential for creating effective active labor market poli-
cies with other actors. To summarize, the different adjustment capacity of  generous welfare states 
to changed economic conditions prompted closer examination of  the underlying logic between the 
existence of  collective organizations and institutions and policy outcomes. One consequence of  
these efforts was to recognize variation in the structure of  institutions previous discussed as relatively 
homogenous, such as business organizations. A second consequence was to illuminate the role of  
factors previously side-lined in the literature, such as the state, and demonstrate the relevant effects 
of  these factors for policy outcomes.
From this discussion, I generate hypotheses about the relationship between economic and politi-
cal institutions and the frequency and intensity of  private fi rms’ participation in active labor mar-
ket policies. First, I start from the fi nding of  scholars within the varieties of  capitalism approach 
that business organizations support the development of  coordinated solutions to shared problems. 
However, drawing on the literature that identifi es divisive elements within business organizations, I 
contend that the structure of  business organization is critical to building broad support for active 
labor market policies. Passive social policies arguably resolved collective action problems between 
employers and employees central to the production process and therefore to the success of  the fi rm. 
Active labor market policies, on the other hand, can hardly be assumed to play such a pivotal role in 
fi rms’ core functions. The main benefi ciaries of  active policies are marginalized workers. The dis-
advantages facing unemployed workers in the labor market are many: the occurrence and duration 
of  an unemployment spell weakens an individual’s self-esteem (Seligman 1975), reduces their skill 
levels (Pissarides 1992), and incurs a potential stigma among employers, which can be seen in the 
wage penalty suffered by workers who were unemployed prior to their current employment position 
(Arulampalam 2001; Gangl 2004).
The potential benefi ts to private fi rms are less clear. Tight labor supply and generous subsidies, 
respectively, may provide fi rms with incentives to hire workers through active labor market policies. 
At the same time, these factors will only prove realistic incentives in cases where fi rms remain open 
to hiring from the pool of  marginalized workers in the fi rst place. Since employers likely rely on many 
informal channels to fi nd new workers (Montgomery 1991), a potentially large problem plaguing the 
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proponents of  active labor market policies is fi nding ways to motivate fi rms to forego their internal 
networks and hire typically unemployed workers from the public employment service. Therefore, 
inducing fi rm investment in active labor market policies relies on building awareness about and open-
ness towards active policies and their potential benefi ts to fi rms. The potential continued reliance of  
fi rms on passive social policies will also have to be considered.
First, peak business organizations represent one avenue for building fi rm support for active labor 
market policies. On the one hand, these institutions hold an interest in alleviating skill shortages. On 
the other hand, they also have the resources to launch a campaign to motivate fi rms to invest in active 
policies in order to maintain a large supply of  well-trained workers. Countries with strong peak-level 
business organizations should therefore be related to relatively high levels of  business support for 
active labor market policies aimed at private fi rms.
If, however, fi rm-level business coordination is strong in a given country, the opposite is likely 
true: since this type of  coordination particularly strengthens fi rms’ capacities to develop highly ef-
fi cient fi rm-based responses, fi rms in this context are likely to regard a policy proposal that interferes 
with their hiring practices as an intrusion on their core company strategies, leading them to denounce 
such proposals. Although any type of  coordinative institution should help build support for social 
policies, convincing fi rms in contexts with high fi rm-level coordination will face the challenge of  
overcoming initial scepticism and communicating clearly the benefi ts of  these policies to fi rms.  
Third and last, the state, similar to peak-level business organizations, has the resources to launch 
a campaign motivating fi rms to invest in active labor market policies. And, in contrast to peak busi-
ness organizations, the state holds an intrinsic interest in reducing unemployment. Also, due to its 
extent resources, the state can therefore place additional pressure on fi rms to hire unemployed indi-
viduals. In short, both peak business organizations and the state theoretically exhibit an interest and 
the resources to develop a campaign inducing fi rm support for active labor market policies. These 
hypotheses are listed below in Table 1.
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Table 1. Hypotheses about Factors Infl uencing Investment of Private Firms in Active Labor Market  
 Policies
1.  Countries with strong peak-level business organizations will be related to extensive cam-
paigns for active labor market policies and a high degree of  fi rm participation in these poli-
cies.
2.  Countries with strong fi rm-level business coordination will be related to the dominance of  
fi rm-level solutions to human capital dilemmas, weak national campaigns for active labor 
market policies aimed at private fi rms, and low participation of  private fi rms in these poli-
cies.
3.  The presence of  a strong state will be related to the enactment of  active labor market poli-
cies aimed at improving the integration of  marginalized workers into the labor market and 
extensive campaigns for active labor market policies
Having reviewed the literature on the relationship between business and social policy and listed 
the hypotheses for private fi rms’ participation in active labor market policies, I turn now to the sub-
stance of  the paper. I will fi rst outline the methodology before turning to the analysis.
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Methodology3. 
Case Selection
The three countries of  Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands are selected according to Mill’s 
method of  difference. Although all three are generally considered to be generous welfare states, 
they differ broadly on the characteristics discussed above including federalism, the structure of  their 
business organizations, and the size of  the state. The table below provides descriptive data regarding 
these characteristics. The data on federalism is a three-pronged measure: none, weak, and strong. The 
measure of  fi rm-level cooperation are factors scores generates from four variables, which include the 
presence of  cooperative institutions between purchasers and suppliers, competing fi rms, and labor 
and management as well as the presence of  functional departments within fi rms. The variable for 
tripartite neo-corporatism comes from Hicks and Swank (1992) and measures the degree of  coor-
dination between peak employers and trade union confederations and the state. Finally, the measure 
for public sector employment is the proportion of  civilian government employment as a percent of  
total employment. 
A brief  glance at Table 2 below demonstrates that Germany is the only country of  the three 
selected that exhibits a strong federalist structure. In contrast, all three countries exhibit well-organ-
ized business organizations, although the structure of  these organizations differ in important ways. 
In Denmark, high levels of  cooperation between fi rms are complemented by peak level organiza-
tions capable of  negotiating strongly with both national political leaders and local economic actors. 
Whereas the factor scores for fi rm-level cooperation are relatively low in the Netherlands, the high 
Dutch score for tripartite neo-corporatism is relatively close to the Danish score. Germany, on the 
other hand, scores quite high on the fi rm-level cooperation factor, but quite low on the tripartite 
neo-corporatism variable. Finally, the public sector in Denmark, as measured by the average share 
of  public sector workers in the 1990s, is markedly higher than in Germany or the Netherlands. The 
measure for public sector employment not only captures the state’s direct responsibility over a given 
proportion of  the workforce, but also taps into the broader capacity of  the state to pursue its distinct 
policy goals. In short, the selection of  Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands resulted from the 
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variation on key variables of  interest, which allows some insight into the explanatory power of  these 
variables with respect to differences in fi rms’ participation in active labor market policies.
Table 2. State and Interest Group Structures in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands
 
Federalisma Shop Floor b, c Tripartite 
Neocorporatism 
b, d
Size of the 
Public Sectora, 
e
Australia weak 0.08 0.30 9.94
Austria weak 0.28 0.70 12.82
Belgium strong (since 1990) 0.28 0.58 9.45
Canada strong 0.08 0.18 14.09
Denmark none 0.28 0.67 21.36
Finland none 0.41 0.73 13.78
France none 0.10 0.32 13.58
Germany strong 0.42 0.23 8.07
Ireland none 0.08 0.00 6.71
Italy none 0.47 0.10 8.30
Japan none 0.94 0.15 5.85
Netherlands none 0.09 0.41 6.01
Norway none 0.39 0.95 21.83
New Zealand none 0.08 0.36 10.54f
Sweden none 0.34 1.00 22.40
Switzerland strong 0.28 0.23 8.57
United Kingdom none 0.09 0.31 10.32
United States strong 0.12 0.04 10.19
Source: a=(Huber et al 2004); b=(Hicks & Kenworthy 1998); c=Firm-level cooperation; d=Hicks and Swank 
 measure for tripartite neo-corporatism; e=average of  civilian government employment of  the working age 
 population for the 1990s; f  = due to missing data the results for New Zealand are taken from the 1980s.
The ways in which these factors infl uence active labor market policies is outlined below in Figure 
1. First, the state, political competition, and employer organizations pass a host of  active labor market 
policies through a policy-making process. The success of  active labor market policies in facilitating 
the labor market integration of  marginalized workers depends on the broader structure of  passive 
labor market policies and employer organization. The darker boxes indicate the foci of  the study, or 
dependent variables, whereas the lighter boxes indicate the main explanatory variables. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework
Methodological Tools
The methodological approach involves structured interviews based on original Danish research 
by Cathie Jo Martin (Martin 2004b; Martin & Swank 2004; Martin 2004c). For each country, a ran-
dom sample of  100 fi rms was selected from the list of  the 500 largest fi rms in each country. 1 The 
list of  the largest 500 fi rms was provided by the Børsen list in Denmark, the CDAX list in Germay, 
and the FEM Business list in the Netherlands. Structured interviews were held either in person or via 
telephone, lasted between 40 and 90 minutes, and were typically conducted with a human resources 
director. Data collection was completed by Cathie Jo Martin for Denmark in 2001 and by the author 
in 2006 and 2007 for Germany and in 2007 and 2008 for the Netherlands.
The structured interviews included more or less two broad groups of  questions. The fi rst group 
of  questions covered background information about the fi rm: the fi rms’ fi nances, personnel, and 
organizational networks. The second theme involves the fi rms’ experiences with active labor market 
policies, including topics such as sources of  information about active measures, the fi rms’ actual use 
of  these measures, the experiences of  participating fi rms, and the reasons why fi rms chose to use or 
not use these measures. 
1 In Denmark, every fi fth fi rm was selected. In Germany and the Netherlands, fi rms were divided into groups of  fi ve. 
For each group of  fi ve, the fi rms were assigned random numbers and the fi rm receiving the highest number in each 
group was selected. 
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The question regarding fi rm participation in active labor market policies was recoded for the 
cases of  Denmark and Germany in order to facilitate comparison and further analysis. The way in 
which the responses to this question were coded deserves some attention. The interview partner 
was asked the following question: “Did your fi rm use any of  the following policies? When yes, how 
many?”. If  fi rms answered ‘no’ to this question, they were questioned further about whether they 
would consider using these policies in the future and asked to elaborate on the reasons for their deci-
sion not to participate as well as their opinion about the role of  these policies in responding to the 
problem of  unemployment. These questions were, aside from other goals, used to assess whether the 
fi rm was against the policies for ideological reasons. 
The fi ndings from these two sets of  questions were then used to construct a fi ve-pronged meas-
ure of  fi rm-participation in active labor market policies. The ordinal measures of  fi rm participation 
ranges from 1 to 5, where 1 and 2 indicate degrees of  non-participation and 3, 4, and 5 indicate 
varying intensities of  participation. With regards to the measures of  non-participation, 1 indicates 
non-participation and ideological opposition to active labor market policies. Another value of  non-
participation is created, however, in order to capture fi rms that did not participate, but do not demon-
strate ideological opposition to active labor market policies. In other words, they did not participate 
but are not fundamentally opposed to the idea of  active labor market policies and would potentially 
consider using these policies. The value for this type of  participation is 2. 
The three values of  the fi rm participation measure are 3, 4 and 5. The value of  3 is given to fi rms 
that participated, but only at the most minimal level. In all case, participation involved hiring a single 
individual. Also, besides the low use of  these policies, the decision of  the fi rm to participate was 
more accidental than deliberate. Frequently, the fi rm had already decided to hire the individual and 
realized later that they were able to receive a state subsidy for doing so. 
The remaining two values for participation, 4 and 5, denote fi rm participation in active labor 
market policies in cases where fi rms were observed to consciously bear these policies in mind when 
making new hires. A distinction is retained, however, in terms of  the actual numbers of  new hires 
made with the use of  an active labor market policy. A value of  4 is reserved for those fi rms that hired 
a few workers with an active labor market, but refrained from a formal commitment to participating 
or otherwise implicit agreement to prioritize hiring with the aid of  an active labor market policy. On 
the other hand, a value of  5 denotes a high level of  participation in active labor market policies, where 
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fi rms demonstrated a strong commitment to hiring with the use of  these policies. In Denmark, this 
commitment was verifi ed by the signing of  a formal agreement, whereas in Germany high commit-
ment to hiring with the use of  an active labor market policy was assessed by the number of  positions 
for which fi rms received an active labor market policy as well as qualitative data from the interview 
partner that demonstrated the high commitment of  the fi rm to hiring with these policies. 
The German case required the dependent variable to be coded twice, because of  the nature of  
active labor market policies in Germany. Theoretically, active labor market policies are designed to 
improve the employed chances of  marginalized workers, which are mainly understood to be unem-
ployed workers. In Germany, however, the main policy included Midi- and Mini-jobs, which have the 
unique feature of  being fi lled with non-marginalized workers. For this reason, I coded two measures 
for fi rm participation in Germany: the fi rst measure assessed fi rm participation of  all active labor 
market policies whereas the second assessed fi rm participation for the subset of  policies used by 
previously unemployed individuals. This was achieved by fi rst asking fi rms whether their Midi- or 
Mini-jobs were fi lled by unemployed individuals and then adjusting the coding of  the fi rst measure 
accordingly.
The list of  active labor market policies about which fi rms were questioned were chosen from 
the National Action Plan for Employment and Competitiveness from the year prior to the begin-
ning of  the interviews. For Denmark, this included leave schemes, job rotation, and programs for 
workers with permanent disability, including fl eksjobs and skaanejobs. For Germany, this included 
tax redemptions on part-time work, in the form of  Mini- and Midi-Jobs, relocation subsidies, and 
subsidies for training regular workers, training additional apprenticeships, and hiring disabled work-
ers. In the Netherlands, this included subsidies for hiring or maintaining disabled workers as well as 
individualized projects coordinated with the municipalities. The Netherlands proved a unique case 
where private employment agencies play a central role in labor market reintegration and extensive 
fi rm and inter-fi rm projects exist that bolster the employability of  marginalized workers or those at 
risk for marginalization. 
The analysis proceeds by fi rst providing a summary of  each country’s experiences with active 
labor market policies involving both national level policy reform as well as the experiences of  indi-
vidual fi rms. For each country, I begin by reviewing the development of  active labor market policies 
as well as the rules governing individuals’ responsibility to be available as subjects of  these policies. 
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Both aspects are relevant, because the passage of  active labor market policies alone does not ensure 
that these policies will indeed be used. As long as workers are able to draw on passive support in cases 
of  unemployment, the incentives to take part in an active labor market program are rather weak. In 
short, gauging fi rm investment in active labor market policies prompts questions about the availabil-
ity of  these policies and this section clarifi es the policies available to private fi rms in each case. This 
discussion fi ts thematically into the debate on activation, or increasing individuals’ incentives to take 
up jobs and the various policy mixes that produce such incentives. 
The analysis below will distinguish three separate types of  questions regarding the formation and 
implementation of  active labor market policies. First, I will provide an overview of  the design of  
active labor market policies in the last decade. Second, I will explain how active labor market policies 
interact with other type of  labor market reforms to provide some insight into how active labor mar-
ket policies are used as part of  a broader package of  reforms. Third, I will assess fi rms’ investment 
patterns in active labor market policies and explore the consequences for our understanding of  fi rm 
support for the integration of  marginalized workers.
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Analysis I4. 
Sustained low growth rates since the mid-1980s generated tremendous budgetary pressure on 
generous welfare states committed to providing income support to unemployed workers. Long-term, 
generous income support during unemployment spells was also shown to reduce individuals’ chances 
of  fi nding a new job. Together, this heightened fi nancial pressure and reduced employment chances 
signaled fundamental problems for the sustainability of  the welfare state. 
By the mid-1990s, broad consensus among political actors across generous welfare states recog-
nized the imperative to adjust policies in order to refl ect this changed environment. To restore the vi-
ability of  the welfare state, it was necessary to advance reforms aimed at reducing reliance on policies 
that provide income support without any obligation to work (passive policies) and expand policies 
that facilitate integration into paid employment (active or activating policies). At the same time, any 
attempt of  the state to revoke their historic promise to provide income support as a matter of  right 
both threatens to incur opposition from those who use or otherwise rely on these policies as well as 
depends critically on developing a winning coalition for new policy agendas. 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands all managed to create reform agendas aimed at reduc-
ing the right of  individuals to income support, and thereby reducing the fi nancial burden on the state; 
in each country, active labor market policies represented part of  the reform package. The speed, de-
gree of  consensus, and extensiveness of  the reforms achieved in these three welfare states, however, 
varied tremendously, not least with respect to reforms in active labor market policies aimed at private 
fi rms.  In the space below I will review these three reform agendas, paying particular attention to 
changes in active labor market policies and how they interact with passive social policies. I will then 
focus on the participation of  private fi rms in each case and examine the nature of  their involvement 
in the integration of  marginalized workers. Afterwards, I will compare the fi ndings and discuss the 
implications for our understanding of  the theoretical determinants of  ‘activating’ reforms. 
Denmark
In Denmark, the reforms initiated by the Social Democrats in 1994 mark a key turning point in 
the relationship between social policy and labor market activation. The approach adopted in Den-
mark can be described as one of  broad consensus among many economic and political actors. In 
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terms of  policy content, active labor market policies were developed that, by design, limit reliance 
on existing passive policies. The reforms stipulated the duty of  individuals to take up employment 
within a limited time; this period was further reduced throughout the 1990s. The 1994 reform only 
targeted unemployment insurance recipients, whereas the 1996 reform also included social assistance 
recipients. In light of  the unlimited duration of  unemployment benefi ts of  the mid-1980s, the extent 
of  these reforms is quite remarkable. 
Supporting the smooth implementation of  these reforms was a vast network of  institutions. For 
instance, the 1994 reform included the creation of  a new administrative unit, the National Labor 
Market Council.2 The National Labor Market Council acts as an advisory institution to the Ministry 
of  Labor and defi nes goals and output requirements for the Regional Labor Market Councils (for-
merly Labor Market Boards), which then establish plans to suit local needs (Jensen & Studies 1999). 
Together, the National and Regional Labor Market Councils act as forum for regional strategic plan-
ning that aims to facilitate adaptation to local labor market needs within the fi nancial constraints 
set out by the Ministry of  Employment. Although the local employment offi ces are responsible for 
matching jobless individuals to active labor market policies, the Regional Labor Market Councils de-
velop priorities for labor market policies and identify target groups. In this way, the regional Councils 
provide guidance for the local employment offi ces that allows them to facilitate a closer and timelier 
match between job-seekers and available positions. In short, “[t]he Danish government strengthened 
associations by creating corporatist channels in the realm of  social policy that mirror those of  labour-
market policy. Although social policy has traditionally been left to government, the Social Ministry’s 
efforts expanded the jurisdiction of  the social partners” (Martin 2004a, p. 148).
With regards to private fi rms, the 1994 reforms etched out a new role for them in the reintegra-
tion of  marginalized workers into the labor market. Although many active labor market policies were 
expanded through these reforms, the major change was in the strictly limited duration of  unemploy-
ment insurance, which meant that participation in active labor market policies became obligatory 
rather than predominantly voluntary. This implied a larger responsibility for private fi rms to provide 
jobs for the unemployed. As case in point, of  the 55 fi rms interviewed in Denmark in 2001, fi fty-
eight percent agreed that the active labor market policies in place at that time were ‘asking fi rms to get 
2 The National Labor Market Council was merged with the National Social Council in 2003 to form the National Em-
ployment Council. The National Social Council originally aims to create a more inclusive labor market.
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involved in a new way,’ whereas twenty-one percent had mixed opinions and remaining twenty-one 
percent found the reforms a clear continuation of  previous policies. As such, it is not only the case 
that the activation reforms of  the 1990s created new policies, but the reforms also called for private 
fi rms to take more responsibility in the implementation of  the active labor market policies. 
Although diffi culties persist in measuring the degree of  altruistic fi rm behavior, the reforms 
nevertheless suggest a willingness of  employers to remain open to the growing problem of  labor 
market marginalization. The expanded responsibility of  private fi rms in the reintegration of  margin-
alized workers not only refl ects the state’s preference for fi rm involvement in public policy initiatives, 
but also conveys a sense of  self-assurance on the part of  the state that fi rms would indeed become 
involved. 
Drawing on interview data on social responsibility provides some evidence for this claim. Tables 
3 and 4 demonstrate fi rms’ responses to the questions of  whether the fi rm should have social respon-
sibility for its own as well as socially excluded individuals. Social responsibility is understood to mean 
the responsibility of  fi rms to take action beyond what they are legally required to do. Table 3 shows 
that almost all Danish fi rms feel responsible for providing for the well-being of  their workers above 
and beyond the legal requirements.
Table 3. Danish Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm have social responsibility for own
 workers
Response Percent Frequency
No 0 0
Maybe 2 1
Yes 98 53
With reference to the responsibility of  the fi rm towards socially excluded individuals, the record 
is more mixed. Still, forty-one percent of  fi rms agreed that fi rms indeed have such a responsibility 
and thirty-three percent answered that the fi rm maybe should hold such a responsibility. What these 
data demonstrate is an overwhelming willingness of  fi rms to consider the potentially damaging ex-
ternalities of  the production process of  workers’ well-being.
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Table 4. Danish Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm take social responsibility for socially-
 excluded people such as long-term unemployed?
Response Percent Frequency
No 26 14
Maybe 33 18
Yes 41 22
The augmentation of  state institutional capacity through the 1994 reforms and fi rms’ openness 
to these new policies did not signal a reduction in fi rms’ competencies. In fact, quite to the contrary, 
a larger role for the state in active labor market policies created new roles for fi rms and their organi-
zations. With respect to business organizations in particular, Martin explains that although “moving 
beyond the established channels to build networks with fi rms threatened the traditional hegemony of  
the employers’ associations, this move paradoxically may have motivated these groups to expand their 
activities in the social area. The organizations perceived the government’s move as an attack on their 
jurisdiction; consequently, this move may serve to enhance employers’ involvement with social policy 
in the long term. Thus, the continuing vitality of  the Danish employers’ associations owes something 
to state activism.” (Martin 2004a, p. 148). Therefore, the state, rather than expanding its authority at 
the expense of  that of  fi rms, has actually created an agenda that resulted in a new role for private 
fi rms and their organizations.
In practice, the 1994 and subsequent reforms managed to engage fi rms in the reintegration of  
marginalized workers. Table 5 below presents the intensity of  the fi rms’ participation in active labor 
market policies that were interviewed in this study. Sixty-nine percent of  the fi rms interviewed used 
active labor market policies, and fi fty percent of  these fi rms signed a formal agreement to take up 
these policies. In short, the overwhelming majority of  fi rms in Denmark participated in active labor 
market policies and, for many of  them, the intensity of  their participation is quite high.
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Table 5. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Denmark
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 34 19
4 - Marginal participation 33 18
3 - Weak participation 2 1
2 - Non-participation 22 12
1 - Ideological non-participation 9 5
Total 100 55
Germany
Germany reveals a long tradition of  active labor market policies (Janoski 1994). Although these 
policies, true to their name, historically aimed to improve the employment prospects of  job-seekers, 
they functioned largely independent of  other labor market policies, which meant that participation 
in an active labor market policy was typically voluntary and non-participation did not limit individu-
als’ right to other forms of  passive support. Therefore, although active labor market policies were 
in place, their role remained marginal and individuals relied to a much larger extent on passive labor 
market policies during interruptions in their working life.
Despite a growing unemployment problem in the 1990s, efforts to transition away from passive 
social policies encountered resistance from a number of  sources. First, the German system protects 
job-seekers’ right to select employment prospects suited to their skill level, which is referred to as 
‘reasonable work’ (zumutbare Arbeit). In the 1990s, debates over labor market reform frequently 
discussed this tradition by challenging conceptions of  what should be considered ‘reasonable work.’ 
Second, due to its federal structure, increasing fi nancial and administrative problems between the 
federal employment agency and municipalities frustrated the development of  a coherent agenda 
with regards to active labor market policies. Finally, the strong legal distinction between active labor 
market policies and other types of  labor market reforms also inhibited an encompassing reform of  
labor market policy in Germany. Due to these three factors, the 1990s was largely a period of  politi-
cal stand still. 
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At the same time that attempts to adjust passive labor market policy were met with little success, 
the state committed a large percentage of  the budget to active labor market policies. In this period, 
fi rms could receive large government subsidies for training unemployed workers. A lawyer at the 
German Confederation of  Skilled Crafts, or Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, explained, 
however, that the vast expenditure in training did not translate in effi cient reintegration, because there 
were never mechanisms set in place to ensure suffi cient market demand for skills delivered by training 
fi rms.3 As such, interested fi rms would take on trainees, but these trainees would frequently fail to 
fi nd employment after the completion of  their training period. After the placement scandal, or Ver-
mittlungsskandal, in 2002, when the federal placement agency was revealed as having largely forged 
their placement statistics, the government embarked on a host of  policy reforms which included a 
seventy percent reduction in the training budget for unemployed workers. Therefore, although pri-
vate fi rms previously played a larger role in the reintegration of  marginalized workers, their participa-
tion did not on average improve the employment chances of  marginalized workers much at all. Also, 
since the reduction in the training budget in 2002, the government has not developed innovative ways 
to involve private fi rms in the reintegration of  marginalized workers. Outside of  training policy, the 
active labor market policies available to private fi rms in Germany in 2006 did not represent a strong 
departure from previous policies. Various subsidy programs offered fi rms fi nancial relief  to hire disa-
bled workers, apprentices, and replacement workers for workers on leave (job rotation).
The Hartz reforms, implemented in 2003 to 2005, marked a signifi cant move away from a passive 
welfare state with respect to labor market policy. The last reform merged unemployment assistance 
and social assistance to form a new means-tested benefi t called Arbeitslosengeld II. The remaining 
reforms restructured the job placement bureaus, established a subsidy for entrepreneurs, the Ich-AG, 
and provided tax relief  for part-time work in the form of  the Midi- and Mini-job. Together, these 
reforms represent a massive reduction in the state’s commitment to income support during periods 
3 Interview, November 2006. 
Page ● 33
An Analysis of Firm Support for Active Labor Market Policies 
of  labor market exit; since large numbers of  individuals do not qualify for unemployment insurance, 
the existing benefi t system is largely means-tested.
Even though spending on reintegration activities was reduced in 2002, active labor market poli-
cies play a small role in the Hartz reforms. While the restructuring of  the placement services consti-
tutes a policy reform aimed at making it easier for individuals to fi nd jobs, Midi- and Mini-jobs as well 
as Ich-AG were the only policies established to facilitate labor market integration.  
Despite the passage of  new active labor market policies in 2003, fi rms did not fi nd that these 
reforms called for a larger role for private fi rms in the reintegration of  marginalized workers. Eighty-
fi ve percent of  fi rms indeed responded that fi rms did not have a larger role as a result of  these 
changes, and only fi fteen percent agreed that there was perhaps a larger role for private fi rms. No 
fi rm fully agreed that these reforms created a new role for private fi rms
I argue that part of  the explanation for the lack of  active labor market policies lies in the unwill-
ingness of  fi rms to participate in the reintegration of  marginalized workers. As in Denmark, survey 
questions about social responsibility provide some evidence for this argument. The tepid support of  
fi rms for social issues above minimum legal requirements is evident from Tables 5 and 6. Compared 
to the Danish fi rms, who overwhelmingly supported the idea fully that they should have social re-
sponsibility for their workers, only thirty-three fi rms fully agreed with this idea in Germany and eight 
percent appeared somewhat in support. Turning to the results in Table 6, a full eighty-three percent 
of  fi rms disagree with that idea that they should have social responsibility for socially excluded work-
ers. There were some, seventeen percent, who were somewhat in support of  this idea, but not a single 
fi rm agreed fully that they should bear responsibility for socially excluded workers.
Table 6. German Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm have social responsibility for own
  workers?
Response Percent Frequency
No 65 26
Maybe 10 4
Yes 25 10
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Table 7. German Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm take social responsibility for socially-
 excluded people such as long-term unemployed?
Response Percent Frequency
No 83 33
Maybe 17 7
Yes 0 0
Firms’ resistance to providing for socially-excluded people translates into low participation rates 
in active labor market policies. In the fi rst coding of  the dependent variable, all active labor market 
policies were included regardless of  whether they were used to hire previously unemployed indi-
viduals or not. The total percentage of  fi rms participating in active labor market policies does not 
look too different from Denmark. Sixty-two percent of  German fi rms, compared to Denmark’s 
sixty-nine, hired at least one worker with the use of  a wage subsidy. The intensity of  German fi rms’ 
participation, however, is much lower than in Denmark. Most fi rms only hired one individual with 
the use of  an active labor market policy, and only four percent (two fi rms) used active labor market 
policies as a core human resource strategy.
Table 8. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Germany (All Policies)
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 4 2
4 - Marginal participation 12 6
3 - Weak participation 46 24
2 - Non-participation 33 17
1 - Ideological non-participation 6 3
Total 100 52
Considering now the second measure of  fi rm participation, where participation in active labor 
market policies is only counted as such when fi rms hired previously unemployed individuals, the 
participation rates decrease dramatically. Only forty-one percent of  fi rms participated and the large 
majority of  these fi rms only hired one individual with an active labor market policy. The remaining 
fi rms, sixty percent of  the total interviewed, did not hire an unemployed individual with the aid of  
an active labor market policy. Although ideological opposition to participation in active labor market 
policies was less common in Germany than in Denmark, the German active labor market policies 
did not actually require fi rms to take on new responsibilities, which, in addition to their low take up 
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of  these policies, suggests that they simply were not under much pressure to consider seriously using 
these programs.
Table 9. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in Germany (Only Previously Unemployed)
Response Percent Frequency
5 - High participation 2 1
4 - Marginal participation 8 4
3 - Weak participation 31 16
2 - Non-participation 54 28
1 - Ideological non-participation 6 3
Total 100 52
Netherlands
As in Denmark and Germany, Dutch reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s also responded to the 
growing budgetary crisis brought on by the shrinking active to passive ratio. The Wassenaar Agree-
ment of  1982, which succeeded at guaranteeing wage restraint, was followed by the New Course 
Agreement in 1993, which broke new ground in terms of  gaining employers’ support for shorter 
working hours in exchange for union support for more fl exible employment protection for workers 
on a permanent contract. 
Although generous active labor market policies to private fi rms existed throughout the 1990s, 
the activation strategies currently in place in the Netherlands refl ect another trend which aims at 
increasing fl exibility. Where private employment agencies fl ourished after reforms in 1996, these and 
similar fi rms had, by 2001, nearly completely assumed the role of  reintegrating unemployed individu-
als. In fact, in late 2001, the public employment service was offi cially dismantled and divided into 
separate parts (Sol & Westerveld 2005), which included the Centres for Work and Income, Centra 
voor Werk en Inkomen, and the Employee Insurance Agency, the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemers-
verzekeringen. The division of  the public employment service into different institutions represented 
a rationalization, and in part reduction, in the public management of  unemployment. The Centres 
for Work and Income specialized in training, and the Employment Insurance Agency administered 
social benefi ts and assessed the necessary integration needs of  unemployed workers. The actual task 
of  matching jobs to job-seekers, however, fell mainly to private employment agencies and private re-
Page ● 36
Moira Nelson
integration companies. For their part, private employment agencies developed departments or entire 
subsidiaries to handle reintegration services, such as USG Restart within USG People and Manpower 
Reintegratie Services within Manpower, to name a few. Private reintegration companies also com-
peted for government bids to reintegrate unemployed individuals. 
Although these changes were accompanied by an almost complete fading out of  existing active 
labor market policies to private fi rms, the delegation of  reintegration services to particular fi rms did 
not imply the absence of  a role for regular fi rms. For comparison with the Danish and German inter-
views, Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate the responses of  Dutch fi rms to the question of  whether they 
should have social responsibility for their own as well as socially excluded workers. The results for 
Dutch fi rms’ view of  their social responsibility towards their own workers are somewhere in between 
those from Denmark and Germany. Although roughly half  of  the fi rms do not believe that they have 
a role in providing their workers social benefi ts above the required legal minimum, thirty-two percent 
agree somewhat and twenty-one percent fully agree that they are responsible in this way. 
Table 10. Dutch Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm have social responsibility for own 
 workers?
Response Percent Frequency
No 47 16
Maybe 32 11
Yes 21 7
Turning to the results for socially excluded individuals, the results change. Again refl ecting a 
distribution that places Dutch fi rms somewhere in between the highly ‘socially responsible’ Dan-
ish fi rms and the ‘socially non-responsible’ German fi rms, Dutch fi rms on average did not believe 
that they should take social responsibility for socially excluded individuals, eleven and a half  percent 
somewhat agreed and eighteen percent agreed fully.
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Table 11. Dutch Firms’ Responses to the Question: Should fi rm take social responsibility for socially-
 excluded people such as long-term unemployed?
Response Frequency Percent
No 24 70.5
Maybe 4 11.5
Yes 6 18
Therefore, despite the predominantly small role for regular private fi rms in the reintegration of  
marginalized workers through active labor market policies, regular private fi rms do generally appear 
willing to take social responsibility for their own workers. In 2007, the central employers’ organiza-
tion, VNO-NCW, in pursuit of  more fl exible employment protection, were ready to accept an agree-
ment that would oblige every fi rm with over fi fty employees to participate in the reintegration of  
unemployed individuals. Although the deal fell through, some employers interviewed in this study 
had already begun considering the implications of  such a deal during the early negotiations of  the 
2007 bargaining round. Therefore, although employers and their confederation appear willing to 
consider participating in active labor market policies, they seem to expect considerable concessions 
in exchange for doing so. 
With respect to their own workers, however, employers can be considered highly engaged in 
designing policies to protect their employability. There are roughly two motivations fi rms cited for 
such practices. First, many employers explained that tight labor markets made fi nding skilled workers 
extremely diffi cult. Therefore, many fi rms were using promises of  additional training and future job 
opportunities as a strategy for making their fi rm attractive to potential workers. Second, in an attempt 
to increase the motivation and productivity of  older workers, fi rms were building partnerships with 
similar fi rms and organizing short-term exchanges of  workers. The opportunity to work in a different 
fi rm, they reasoned, will make these workers happier and increase their productivity.
There is therefore an implicit agreement among fi rms that education, both formal as well as on-
the-job, is an important competitive strategy. Although this awareness has not led to extensive par-
ticipation of  fi rms in providing education to marginalized workers, employer organizations remain 
engaged in discussions with the state and the trade unions on new policy needs in the Netherlands. 
For instance, in 2005, the Ministry of  Education and the Ministry for Social and Economic Affairs 
joined efforts in a new agency called ‘Leren en Werken,’ in which learning and working are combined 
to facilitate labor market integration among marginalized workers. Private fi rms play an advisory role 
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in the activities of  this campaign. The main goals of  the campaign are: to create ninety-thousand 
projects where learning and working are combined; thirty-thousand education projects for the most 
disadvantaged workers; and 20,000 projects to help young people acquire an education certifi cate 
(Tros 2008). The Leren en Werken project has also created a campaign to attract workers to the health 
and education sectors, where severe labor shortages exist.
Turning to the participation of  the interviewed fi rms in the various policies aimed at improving 
the reintegration of  marginalized workers, the following pattern emerges. Of  the forty fi rms inter-
viewed, fi ve had reintegration services. This included three private employment companies and two 
fi rms which had developed their own unique policy to reintegrate unemployed workers. Twenty-eight 
percent of  fi rms hired workers receiving a disability benefi t. Two fi rms had employability centers 
within the company, which provided workers with information about new job or training opportuni-
ties. The overwhelming majority of  fi rms interviewed did not participate in any of  these activities. 
Table 12. Firm Participation Patterns in ALMP in the Netherlands
Response (Multiple Responses Possible) Percent Frequency
Private Firms with Reintegration Services 13 5
Firms Hiring Disabled Workers with the Aid of a Wage Subsidy 28 11
Firms with ‘Employability Centers’ 5 2
Firms Not Participating in Any of the Above Activities 65 26
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Analysis II5. 
Next, I examine more carefully the factors that explain fi rms’ participation in active labor market 
policies in Denmark and Germany. The Netherlands is not included in this section for two reasons. 
First, the small number of  participating fi rms makes it diffi cult to gain consistent estimates. Second, 
the set of  active labor market policies that Dutch fi rms could use was not constant across fi rms, 
which makes any generalization about the determinants of  fi rm participation impossible. For in-
stance, if  I would regress the variable for the intensity of  fi rms’ participation in active labor market 
policies on a host of  explanatory variables, the interpretation of  an explanatory variable would read, 
a one unit increase in that explanatory variable leads to a change in fi rm participation in active labor 
market policies equal to the size of  the coeffi cient. Categorical differences between fi rms coded as 
high participation, however, and other fi rms makes such an interpretation meaningless. 
Besides the differing intensity of  fi rm involvement in active labor market policies discussed in 
the preceding section, Table 13 provides some information on the reasons why fi rms participated in 
active labor market policies in Denmark and Germany that helps to clarify the different motivations 
fi rms had to participate in active labor market programs. First, more Danish fi rms listed the subsidy 
as a motivation for participating in active labor market policies than German fi rms. The interviews 
substantiate the quite small effect that the subsidy made in the German case. While the employers 
found the subsidy an added bonus, the majority stated that the decision to apply for fi nancial support 
arose after the fi nalization of  a hiring decision. The fi nancial benefi t that came with using an active 
labor market policy did not guide employers’ hiring decisions.
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Table 13. Reasons for Participating or Not in ALMP
Denmark Germany
Subsidies Motivated Participation 38 18
Labor Shortages Motivated Participation 31 34
Social Responsibility Motivated Participation 51 16
Need for Higher Skills Prevented Participation 36 65
Negative Views of the Unemployed Prevented Participation 20 22
Bureaucratic Diffi culties Prevented Participation 45
At the same time, the respective difference in labor supply between Denmark and Germany does 
not appear to account for the greater attractiveness of  fi nancial support for Danish fi rms. In both 
Denmark and Germany roughly the same percentage of  fi rms listed labor shortages as a reason for 
participation in active labor market policies. This provides at least some evidence that the relatively 
tighter labor market in Denmark does not explain participation levels.
Finally, whereas almost half  Danish fi rms listed corporate social responsibility as a reason for 
participation, a small minority of  German fi rms did so. These results suggest a difference in corpo-
rate culture, where Danish fi rms appear more engaged in social problems than their Germany coun-
terparts. This difference may infl uence participation on a number of  levels, by inducing a higher level 
of  involvement of  fi rms in the policy-making process or changing the human resources strategy of  
fi rms to include greater attention to active measures. 
Turning to the reasons why fi rms limited or decided against participation illuminates further dif-
ferences between the Danish and German cases. German fi rms were roughly double as likely to limit 
participation because of  demand for greater skill needs. One possible explanation can be thrown out, 
namely that the unemployed hold a worse reputation in Germany’s slack labor market: Danish and 
German fi rms exhibit a similar propensity to avoid participation because of  a negative view of  the 
unemployed. Therefore, the common trend among German fi rms to avoid participation because they 
cannot fi nd the appropriate skill set provides some evidence for main hypothesis that marginalized 
workers in Germany do not fi nd access or recognition for skills that employers seek.
The next step of  the analysis tests the various characteristics of  Danish and German fi rms that 
infl uence fi rms’ level of  participation. The results of  the analysis are below in Table 11. Model I 
shows the results for Denmark, whereas Models II and III show the German results. Two models 
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were run for Germany because of  the two different ways of  coding the dependent variable: Model II 
has the coding from Table 10 (all policies) and Model III has the coding from Table 14 (only policies 
for the unemployed.  The measurement of  the variables was as follows. Membership in an employers 
association was a dummy variable where membership was coded as 1. Variables for the skill profi le of  
a fi rm were coded as percent of  total workers. Wages was coded as the amount spent on staff  costs 
divided by the number of  employees. The wages variable was divided by ten thousand to facilitate 
interpretation, whereas the variable for size (total revenue) was divided by a trillion to facilitate inter-
pretation. Profi t was measured as total profi ts divided by total revenue. The variables for public sector 
sales and exports were each measured as a percent of  total sales. The variable for union presence was 
coded as 0 for doesn’t know, 1 for no, and 2 for yes. The data for employer organization member-
ship, skill profi le, public sector sales, exports, and union presence were attained from the interviews, 
whereas the data for sales, profi ts, and wages was derived from fi rms’ annual reports.  
The variables for membership in an employer organization, percentage of  white collar workers, 
and percentage of  low-skilled blue collar workers are of  central interest. In both cases, membership 
in an employer organization increase fi rms’ level of  participation in active labor market policies: in 
Denmark membership leads to a 1.475 unit increase in participation level. In Germany membership 
leads to a repealed unit increase in participation level if  considering participation in all active labor 
market policies regardless of  whether these policies were used to hire unemployed or not. If  limiting 
the measure of  participation to those policies used to hire unemployed individuals, as seen in Model 
III, membership in an employer organization is no longer increases participation in active labor mar-
ket policies. 
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Considering the skill profi le of  participating fi rms, stark differences exist between Denmark and 
Germany. In Denmark, a 50 percent decrease in the percentage of  white collar workers led to a 0.75 
unit increase in the participation level. This shows that fi rms with mostly blue-collar workers, regard-
less of  whether they are high-skilled or not, are likely to participate. 
In Germany, however, only those fi rms with low-skill blue-collar workers were more likely to par-
ticipate. A 50 percent increase in the percentage of  low-skilled blue collar workers leads to a 0.6 unit 
increase in the participation level. These results imply that Danish fi rms participate in active labor 
market policies in order to gain access to skilled personnel, whereas German fi rms use these policies 
to gain access to cheap labor.
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Table 14. Regression Analyses of German and Danish Firms
Denmark Germany
Model 1 Model II Model III
Employer Association 1.475 ** 0.475 * 0.123
[0.556] [0.271] [0.245]
Low Skilled Blue Collar Workers 1.225 * 1.096 *
[0.006] [0.522]
White Collar Workers -0.015 **
[0.006]
Wages -0.582 *** 2.323 -1.118
[0.174] [.775] [0.698]
Size -0.069 * 0.057 0.003
[0.032] [0.063] [0.013]
Profi ts -2.98 0.008 0.006
[3.575] [1.401] [0.006]
Public Sector -0.019 * -0.002 -0.006
[0.011] [0.011] [0.010]
Exports -0.004 0.003 0.002
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Unions -0.615 0.026 0.132
[0.472] [0.216] [0.195]
Constant 5.238 *** 1.616 ** 2.392 **
[1.320] [0.698] [0.628]
Adjusted Rsquared 0.394 0.113 0.114
N 55  52   52  
*     Signifi cant beyond .05 level, two tailed test
**   Signifi cant beyond .01 level, two tailed test
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Discussion and Conclusion6. 
The analysis presented in this paper demonstrates the quite different role of  active labor market 
policies in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Denmark is distinct in that active labor market 
policies have been incorporated into a comprehensive structure for dealing with unemployment. 
In contrast, active labor market policies in Germany and the Netherlands experienced a boom in 
the 1990s before giving way to more liberal-oriented reform in the early 2000s. Liberal reforms in 
Germany meant reducing the generosity of  unemployment assistance and social assistance (by merg-
ing them into a low, means-tested benefi t) without greatly expanding the resources available for the 
unemployment to improve their employment or otherwise providing the unemployed with a right 
to work. In the Netherlands, liberal reforms came in the form of  a large privatization of  placement 
services. Although the state did balance these reforms with more pro-active policies to aid the unem-
ployed, such as the Leren en Werken agency, the mass privatization raises large questions about the 
continued responsibility of  the state in fi nding work for the unemployed and therein the guarantee 
of  basic rights available to these individuals.
The reasons for these different reform paths are beyond the scope of  this paper. However, these 
reforms implied a very different role for private fi rms within each context. The Danish reforms 
etched out for private fi rms a new role in the reintegration of  marginalized workers, which largely 
succeeded in motivating fi rms to hire unemployed workers. The German active labor market policies, 
in contrast, did not appear to engage fi rms in any novel way, either in the creation of  active measures, 
or in the implementation of  these policies. In the Netherlands, the situation is mixed. On the one 
hand, private fi rms may be said to play an enormous role in the reintegration of  marginalized workers 
if  one considers the role of  private employment agencies (e.g. Manpower, Randstad), which help to 
reintegrate thousands of  unemployed individuals each year. On the other hand, regular private fi rms 
do not play a substantial role at all. The active labor market policies of  the 1990s have been repealed 
and attempts to develop new policies for fi rms to help reintegrate the unemployed demand high 
concessions to these fi rms. 
Considering now the role of  employer organizations and the state, I consider the question of  
whether the analysis provides evidence for the hypotheses developed in Table 1. Denmark would 
appear to provide clear support for Hypotheses 1 and 3, which relate strong peak level employer 
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organizations and the state, respectively, to the success of  active labor market policies. Employer 
organizations play an active role in the National and Regional Labor Market Councils, which advise 
the local employment offi ces about new target groups. Membership in an employer organization 
increased the participation of  fi rms in active labor market policies. In respect to Hypothesis 3, the 
state played a large role in engineering the restructuring of  the unemployment benefi t system, and the 
Labor Councils are ultimately state-run institutions. 
The Dutch example, however, casts some doubt on Hypothesis I, which relates peak employer 
organizations to successful active labor market policies. Despite the existence of  strong employer 
organizations, the labor market reforms in the Netherlands did not involve regular private fi rms in 
the reintegration of  marginalized workers. Private employment fi rms and reintegration companies 
of  course both play a central role, but that of  regular fi rms is marginal at best. Therefore, it seems 
to be going too far to consider strong employer confederations as a suffi cient for convincing regular 
fi rms to aid in the reintegration of  marginalized workers. Rather, a strong state that holds consider-
able leverage over private fi rms appears necessary to generate the type of  fi rm-level support one sees 
in Denmark.   
The case of  Germany provided the most information about Hypotheses 2, which links fi rm-
level coordination to weak fi rm support for active labor market policies. Despite the state’s attempt 
to develop active labor market policies, these policies failed to engage fi rms in the reintegration of  
marginalized workers. As the analysis described, prior to 2002, fi rms were largely training workers in 
skills for which there were no jobs. In other words, fi rms were involved in aiding marginalized work-
ers, but their activities did not really fulfi l the purported policy goals. The data on fi rms’ opinions 
about their social responsibility towards their own as well as socially-excluded individuals supports 
these fi ndings. Also, the fi rm-level interviews provided evidence that employer organizations did not 
increase participation in active labor market policies targeted specifi cally at unemployed people. 
In sum, the fi ndings suggest that business organizations might be an important vehicle for infl u-
encing fi rm involvement in the resolution of  social problems. However, the analysis also provides a 
warning about the limitations of  these organizations in responding to the problem of  labor market 
marginalization alone. Firms’ propensity to feel responsible for socially-excluded workers generally 
increased with the degree of  business organization centralization, which suggests that centralized 
leadership is necessary to build awareness about shared problems and support for coordinated solu-
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tions. Even in the centralized case of  Denmark, however, it remains a key question how important 
the state was in explaining fi rms’ willingness to help in the reintegration of  marginalized workers. 
Particularly in light of  the Dutch fi rms’ less than enthusiastic attitudes towards active labor market 
programs, it appears that the substantial state subsidies that fi rms receive in Denmark might play a 
role in infl uencing fi rms’ openness to state policy.
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